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This paper attempts to address, in a brief and preliminary fashion,' the
sources of the current asbestos litigation phenomenon. I call our current
asbestos litigation situation a "phenomenon" rather than a "crisis" because
the term "crisis" implies a newly emergent or immediate form of distress. In
my view, the asbestos litigation phenomenon has resulted, in contrast, from
a cumulative set of intentionally adopted changes in law and procedure that
together have created litigation that is and will continue to be unending and
infinite in magnitude. At the time these multiple changes were introduced,
each of them was thought helpful-perhaps even necessary-for dealing
with the consequences of asbestos-related injuries. Together, however, they
have resulted in a litigation phenomenon unlike any other ever experienced
in America or other countries controlled by the rule of law.
In order to appreciate the cumulative effect of these changes, it is
helpful to understand how our composite system of accident law,
government regulation, and market regulation operates to control sources of
injury in our society. As will be seen, this system incorporates a form of
internal self-correction of injury generation that constrains the extent to

* John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. I am grateful to the Program
for Studies in Capitalism at Yale Law School for its support.
1. I have been at work for a number of years and am continuing to work on a project seeking to
identify all of the changes in law and procedure that have been introduced to address asbestos
litigation.

which injuries are suffered and, as a consequence, the extent to which
litigation is required to provide redress for those injuries. As we also shall
see, virtually all of these restraints have been relaxed in the context of
asbestos-related claims. The most significant relaxation occurred within
accident law-the law of torts-and is manifested in the extraordinary
litigation that we observe today.
I. SOCIETAL MECHANISMS FOR CONSTRAINING INJURIES

The structure and the separate elements of the various mechanisms in
society for constraining injury are well-known; the description below is
I wish to emphasize the self-limiting and selfhardly controversial.
correcting nature of the system, which has received somewhat less attention
than individual elements. I first discuss the mechanism of accident law
where the most significant changes have occurred with respect to asbestos.
Our accident law system is called into play with the occurrence of an
injury. In our society, most injuries do not give rise to legal claims and are
redressed by forms of first-party health or accident insurance or by personal
savings or assets. An injury may give rise to a legal action, however, where
it can be claimed that the injury was caused by an identifiable source that
could have prevented the injury.
In such a context, the law empowers the victim to collect full damages
from the injurer. Damages are measured to exactly equal the victim's lossnot more, not less-simultaneously providing compensation to the victim for
the loss and internalizing the costs of the injury to the injuring party. It is
widely believed that the internalization of injury costs will lead the injurer,
and through a deterrent effect, parties that might be injurers, to adjust
activities so that such losses do not occur in the future. 2
Potential injurers may obtain insurance for the liabilities created by their
activities. But insurers execute the insurance function in ways that similarly
serve to create incentives to reduce accidents. For example, insurers
structure the terms of coverage of insurance policies,3 engage in direct risk
control efforts following the inspection of a policyholder's operations, and
underwrite forms of coverage and subsequently change insurance premiums
a policyholder's experience, all to deter injury-causing
based upon
4
behavior.
In cases of extraordinary misbehavior, punitive damages may be
available to serve as an exceptional form of deterrence. But punitive
damages are generally rare and are best defended as means of more perfectly
2. In fact, there is very little empirical evidence demonstrating a reduction in the accident rate
as a consequence of increased liability. See GEORGE L. PRIEST, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE

184 (Litan & Winston eds.. Brookings
Institute 1988).
3. This is accomplished chiefly by excluding or limiting coverage of risks within the control of
the policyholder. See George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of
ACCIDENT RATE IN LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY

CatastropheLoss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996).
4. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.

1521, 1539-50(1987).
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internalizing full injury costs; thus, they are more likely to be awarded where
there is some reason to believe that compensatory damages will be
insufficient. Examples are when the injury is difficult to detect, such as
price-fixing in antitrust law where treble damages are awarded because
consumers can form no independent judgment of the level of the competitive
price and so cannot detect every time they are overcharged; when the
defendant is unknown, such as a midnight dumping of a toxic waste; or
when there has been some effort by the defendant to conceal or cover up the
loss or the source of the loss.
The mechanism of accident law, of course, is organized through a set of
procedural rules that provide for general fairness in its operation. Other
procedural techniques, such as the class action, serve (in theory) to perfect
the system by allowing the aggregation of low-valued claims that otherwise
might not be prosecuted and to achieve efficiency in claims resolution.
For some activities that are expected to generate losses continuouslysuch as activities in the workplace-our society has supplanted tort law with
an insurance system that eliminates the necessity of proving that the accident
could have been practicably prevented. In this type of insurance system,
compensation is provided at levels substantially lower than in tort law, but
total accident costs remain internalized as long as wages incorporate
compensating differentials based
upon workers' perceptions of the risk of
6
suffering uncompensated loSS.
In some instances, the magnitude of losses caused by an injurer's
activities may overwhelm the assets of the injurer, forcing it into bankruptcy,
but these instances are also likely to be rare because of the existence of
insurance and the incentives the accident law system creates to reduce the
frequency and magnitude of injuries. Where there is a bankruptcy, victims
no longer obtain compensation through the accident law system (or obtain
reduced compensation as claimants against the bankrupt's limited assets),
but instead rely on insurance or insurance-like substitutes, such as first-party
insurance, personal assets or, for the extremely low-income, government
provided redress.
As mentioned previously, the legal system is not the only societal
mechanism creating incentives to reduce the accident rate. There exist
additional economic (market) constraints, as well as moral constraints, on
injury-causing behavior. As a general matter, producers have no economic
incentive to provide products or services that needlessly cause injuries.
Once consumers become aware of the injury-causing features of products,
they can be expected to decline to purchase them. Thus, the market itself

5.

See John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform. 62 IND. L.J.

625, 652-53 (1987).
6.

For an effort to measure compensating

differentials, see generally

W. KIP VISCUSI.
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Similarly, although it is infrequently
will discipline loss generation.
emphasized, individuals who make products or manage production are
humans as well. Our society incorporates a general ethic of increasing
safety and reducing loss; no one wants to be held responsible for
unnecessarily contributing to another person's harm when that harm could
have been prevented.
In addition to the market and accident law system, our society imposes
substantial, direct regulation of accident-causing behavior at the federal,
state, and local levels. Federal agencies with authority to mandate safetyrelated investments have been given authority over most important harmcausing activities-agencies such as the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (truck and auto safety), the Federal Aviation Administration
(airline and airplane safety), the Food and Drug Administration
(pharmaceuticals and food products), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (workplace safety), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (pollution and other environmental harms), among others. There are
also vast areas of direct safety regulation at the state and local levels,
including the enforcement of building codes (incorporating a myriad of
safety-related requirements), zoning regulations (limiting the interaction of
industrial and residential uses), the regulation of auto driving through traffic
rules, and, of course, general behavioral regulation by local police. This,
again, is an incomplete list.
Together, these various mechanisms-the market, government
regulation, and accident law-constrain the level of injuries suffered in our
society. These mechanisms are designed to be self-correcting, reducing the
extent of future loss. They do not merely accept losses and compensate
them, they prevent them. Thus, with respect to all activities, as greater
losses accumulate or information develops as to the source of injury
generation, each of these mechanisms for injury control become activated.
The market responds in the form of reduced purchases or higher wage
demands.
Existing regulatory agencies become alerted and consider
mandating safety investments. Relatedly, though after the fact, our system
of accident law internalizes the costs of injuries through an increase in
judgments against the source of the harm. These judgments lead insurers to
manage the risks directly, increase premiums, or, at the limit, exclude
coverage of the risk. To the extent that judgments are not insured, they
serve as a direct economic incentive to the source of the harm to make
investments, to reduce the frequency or magnitude of harm, or to reduce the
level of activity generating the harm. All of these mechanisms serve the
ambition, either directly or through the creation of incentives, of reducing
the extent of harm suffered in our society. And the system appears to work
effectively; there are very few examples in modern history of continuous
sources of loss.
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II. THE ASBESTOS CONTEXT IN CONTRAST

The interesting question, of course, is why is asbestos so different?
What has led our society to a point with respect to asbestos at which there is
no apparent self-correction, with claims of harm from exposure steadily
increasing over time despite hundreds of thousands of settlements between
defendants and injured claimants? In my view, there are multiple sources of
the asbestos litigation phenomenon. The constraints created by the market
were ineffective because of the long time lag between sales of the product
and the recognition of the physical impact of asbestos on health. As a
consequence, today's market forces are irrelevant; there is no United States
market for asbestos. For quite different reasons, government regulation has
been ineffective. The government acted, but it was too late to prevent the
first line of asbestos-related injuries. Asbestos use has been generally
prohibited, but in all other respects, government regulation is generally
irrelevant. 7 The existence of governmental regulation has been ignored by
tort law.
That leaves accident law as the only effective societal mechanism today
for controlling asbestos-related claims. The constraints of accident law,
however, have proved entirely ineffective. Indeed, I believe that changes in
the accident law mechanism have had the effect of increasing the number of
asbestos-related claims and will continue to increase them into the future.
The principal reason is that, over the years, our courts have relaxed each of
the standards and rules that served, in earlier times, to constrain tort law
recoveries. As we shall see, there are no effective constraints on asbestos
litigation in current accident law.
Asbestos litigation is different from any other subject of litigation in the
history of American tort law because courts have believed-and many still
continue to believe-that the problem of providing redress for asbestosrelated losses is so difficult and compelling as to justify changes in each of
the self-correcting features of the mechanism of accident law. Like Holmes'
description of the reason that great cases make bad law, these historical
judicial concerns about asbestos-related injuries represent a response to "a
kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
8
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.",
A brief review of modern accident law shows that the laws of
substantive torts, procedure, insurance, and bankruptcy, among others, have
been relaxed in order to facilitate recovery of asbestos-related claims.
Indeed, we might well describe the law relating to asbestos claims as
establishing a distinct recovery system, different in multiple respects from

7. There is an exception with respect to clean-up activities removing existing asbestos.
8. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904).
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the basic system of law and procedure that addresses all other areas of
injury. In my observation, the asbestos law system has:
1) relaxed the requirement of proving demonstrated injury by
allowing suits and recoveries by exposure-only claimants, by
claimants alleging no more than a fear of injury, and by claimants
desiring monitoring for the detection of a potential injury;
2) relaxed the causation requirement of carefully identifying the
source of the injury. More specifically, the asbestos law system has
relaxed the tort law requirement of showing that the injurer could
have prevented the injury in some practicable way. Most claims
today proceed on a failure-to-warn theory, which is largely fanciful
with respect to actual prevention, since it can hardly be believed
that warnings, if issued, would have effectively eliminated the risk
of injury;
3) provided damages in amounts substantially greater than awarded
for identical injuries in other accident contexts. In an empirical
study in progress, I have found that, in wrongful death cases,
recoveries for asbestos-related losses are multiples greater than
recoveries for equivalent losses (deaths) suffered in other contexts;
4) expanded the concept of joint and several liability beyond its
particular deterrent function and vastly reduced the requirement of
showing causative links, again eliminating any relationship to a
standard that would compel a showing that a defendant could have
prevented the injury;
5) provided punitive damages in magnitudes greater than in other
accident contexts and greater than could possibly be justified by the
deterrence rationale. Indeed, punitive damages in asbestos cases
have turned the justification for that institution on its head. Punitive
damages can be justified only where it is believed that
compensatory damages alone will be insufficient to fully internalize
injury costs to defendants. Punitive damages continue to be
awarded in magnitudes that threaten the prospect of recovering
compensatory damages for thousands of claimants;
6) vastly expanded the obligations of insurers by negating insurer
constraints on coverage in a variety of ways. These include
ignoring the significance of the policy period by adopting forms of
continuous trigger, expanding claims periods, allowing direct
actions, and adopting many other coverage-expanding definitions
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that essentially break down the operation of the basic commercial
general liability policy;
7) ameliorated the concept of litigation finality through the second
injury doctrine;
8) relaxed a variety of procedural rules, such as venue standards and
forum non conveniens, and adopted novel aggregative mechanisms
that cannot be justified either as promoting efficiency of process or
as making possible the litigation of negative-value claims.
These are only a few of the changes in the legal system, which have
resulted from concerns over asbestos-related losses that have generated the
asbestos litigation phenomenon that we observe today. These changes in the
law have been justified by courts, generally uniformly, on the belief that
asbestos-related claims are so compelling that they should command special
rules to address the problem. Asbestos litigation in the United States is
unlike any other form of litigation because each of the limiting and selfconstraining features of our system of accident law have been rendered
ineffective, and each of the elements required for recovery under accident
law have been relaxed.
This is not to say that courts have simply acquiesced to the claim of
every asbestos plaintiff. More typically, judicial decisions in asbestos cases
proceed with rhetoric that allows recovery in the case before the court, yet
still claims to retain some limiting principle with respect to future claims.
The recent United States Supreme Court opinion in Norfolk & Western
Railway Co. v. Ayers9 is illustrative. In that case, the Supreme Court
allowed for first-time claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on
the grounds of fear of cancer from exposure to asbestos, though the Court
insisted that the claim could only proceed if the worker could show some
Thus, the Court vastly expanded
physical manifestation of exposure.
grounds of recovery based upon asbestos exposure (the only claimed injury
was mental anguish) while purporting to retain some limit on the expansion.
Cumulatively, however, this rhetoric of limitation has proved meaningless.
In subsequent cases, the limitations of one case have been relaxed for
another, and the availability of recovery has continued to expand.
These various changes in the law have not been unchallenged, and there
have been efforts to adopt what might be called counter-measures-modest
tort reform and actions against aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys-seeking to
offset or reduce the cumulative effects. The magnitude of the asbestos-

9.

123 S. Ct. 1210(2003).
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related changes to the accident law system, however, cannot easily be
reversed.
As a consequence, we see today, in asbestos litigation, cases that would
have been inconceivable thirty years ago and cases that are still
inconceivable in any context other than asbestos. Many other commentators
at this symposium have commented on settlements involving tens or
hundreds of thousands of claimants. These settlements, however, are
informed by the nature of individual asbestos claims in the courts. This
current individual litigation is extraordinary, and I invite any skeptic to pick
up Mealey's bi-weekly Asbestos Litigation Report to observe the modern
scene.' 0 As merely examples, within the past two years the following cases
have been reported:
1) a California man obtained a $1.1 million judgment where his
only exposure to asbestos consisted of his once changing the brakes
on a family car;"
2) a California man obtained a $4.5 million judgment where his
only known exposure to asbestos occurred during one day when his
mother and grandfather brought
him as a baby to observe the
2
reconstruction of their church;
3) the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed a $9 million verdict in
favor of a woman whose only exposure to asbestos occurred when
she was a child during the time her father was remodeling their
basement using a wallboard joint compound that contained
asbestos. '3
These cases are illustrative of modern asbestos litigation. As is
immediately apparent, they are vastly different from typical cases in other
areas of tort law. Why? Because they are asbestos cases.
Individual cases of this nature, of course, dictate the terms of the
settlements of the claims of thousands. The individuals in these cases
suffered actual diseases (in each case mesothelioma).14 The multi-thousand
claimant settlements most typically involve named plaintiffs with real
diseases and thousands of exposure-only claimants with no disease or
disability. If cases and settlements with these characteristics are possible in
our modern asbestos law system, it is not implausible to predict that the
asbestos litigation phenomenon shows no sign of ending. By these

10. Of course, it is illustrative of the nature of current asbestos litigation that there exists a
demand for a bi-weekly asbestos litigation report.
II. MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Feb. 1, 2002. at 14-15.
12. MEALEY'SLITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Apr. 20, 2001, at 3-4.
13. MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, June 21, 2002, at 4-5.
14. There exists idiopathic (i.e., source unknown) mesothelioma, a defense the respective juries
rejected in each of these cases.
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standards, all Americans are victims of asbestos. All current citizens have
been exposed to the number of asbestos fibers involved in a one-time
changing of brakes or a one day visit to a church under construction, or
emitted by wallboard tape compound in a family basement.
As a consequence, the various predictions of 2 million or 3.5 million
outstanding claims mentioned at this symposium are, in my judgment, vast
underestimates. Given the standards of our current asbestos law system, the
asbestos litigation phenomenon will never end.
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